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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
ALLEN CARL RUSSELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 950033-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Carl Allen Russell appeals his convictions for aggravated arson, a 
first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1995), and theft, a third degree felony 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and -412(b) (1995). The convictions were entered in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Robert L. Newey, on 
temporary appointment, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(k) (Supp. 1995) (transfer from Utah Supreme Court). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
and 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Can the jury selection issue raised by Russell be decided notwithstanding the 
absence of a transcript of the trial jury selection? This question, involving this Court's ability 
to perform appellate review, is necessarily reviewed de novo. See State v. Menzies (Menzies 
/), 845 P.2d 220, 228-33 (Utah 1992). 
2. Based upon the partially-reconstructed jury selection record, did the trial 
court properly deny Russell's single for-cause challenge to a prospective juror; alternatively, 
was any error in that denial harmless because Russell peremptorily struck that juror? A trial 
court's decision on a for-cause juror challenge is deferentially reviewed on appeal, and 
reversed only for "abuse of discretion" or "clear error." State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 649 
(Utah), cert, denied, U.S. , 116 S. Ct.163 (1995); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 395 
(Utah 1993); State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989). Accord Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 146 (1878). When a for-cause challenge is erroneously denied, a verdict 
will be affirmed if the challenging party removed the juror peremptorily, and does not 
demonstrate on appeal that some unacceptable juror therefore sat on the jury. State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 910 (1995). 
Accord Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86-89 (1988). The question whether the latter 
condition exists is one of "harmless error," reviewed de novo on appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This case involves the "impartial jury" clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Also pertinent is rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
which specifies circumstances in which a juror may be dismissed for cause, and rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which explains how to supplement or reconstruct the record on 
appeal. These provisions are copied in appendix I of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Russell was charged with aggravated arson, a first degree felony, and with 
theft, a third degree felony (R. 8-9). A jury found him guilty of both charges (R. 89, 90). He 
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was sentenced to prison terms of five years to life for the aggravated arson and zero to five 
years for the theft, to be served concurrently (R. 95, 96). 
Russell filed his appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, and moved for summary 
reversal, based upon a malfunction of trial court videotaping equipment which had made it 
impossible to preserve a verbatim record of jury selection (Utah Supreme Court No. 940563, 
Summary Reversal Motion, dated 15 December 1994). The supreme court adefer[red] ruling* 
on that motion, and ordered the parties to "proceed to the next stage in the appellate process* 
(Utah Supreme Court No. 940563, Order dated 03 January 1995). Soon afterward, the 
supreme court transferred Russell's appeal to this Court (Order dated 10 January 1995). 
Subsequently, the State stipulated to Russell's motion to reconstruct the missing 
jury selection record (Case No. 950033-CA, Motion to Stay Briefing Pending Reconstruction 
and Supplementation of the Record, dated 28 July 1995; Order dated 10 August 1995). 
Roughly six weeks later, Russell represented to this Court that "neither party* was able to 
reconstruct the record, but that tt[w]ith or without the attempted reconstruction, Mr. Russell is 
prepared to present his arguments on appeal.* He therefore moved to set the briefing 
schedule; this Court granted his motion (Case No. 950033-CA, Motion to Set Briefing 
Schedule, dated 25 September 1995; Order dated 06 October 1995). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Crime 
In brief, the verdict-supporting evidence is as follows: At approximately 7:00 
a.m. on a June morning, a fire was discovered at a Skipper's restaurant on Redwood Road in 
Salt Lake City (R. 135-36). Firefighters extinguished the blaze, and discovered that the 
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restaurant safe was open (R. 152). A restaurant manager calculated that $941.02 cash had 
been taken from the safe (R. 201-03) 
Russell was one of but two or three restaurant employees who had keys and the 
security alarm code necessary to enter the restaurant when closed (as it was in the early 
morning, R. 218), and who also knew the combination to the restaurant safe (R. 220-22, 232, 
256-57). Roughly half an hour before the fire was discovered, a security guard for a nearby 
business observed a red or maroon Toyota pickup truck in the vicinity; the Toyota had 
distinctive, shaded headlamps (R. 265-75). Russell had borrowed a similar vehicle from a 
friend the previous evening at a bowling alley, and did not return it until the day after the 
Skipper's fire (R. 312-23). After returning the borrowed Toyota, Russell asked another friend 
to provide an alibi for his whereabouts at the time of the Skipper's fire (R. 340-43). 
A fire investigator determined that the fire had been intentionally set (R. 364-
67). Additionally, it did not appear that the perpetrator had forced entry into the restaurant 
(R. 371-79). Several days later, the investigator interviewed Russell (R. 393-94). Russell 
admitted that he had a key, and that he knew the restaurant security code and safe combination 
(R. 395). He then gave a false account of his whereabouts on the night before the fire, 
claiming that he had been out bowling until 1:30 a.m. (R. 396); in fact, he had left the 
bowling alley about seven hours earlier in the borrowed Toyota (R. 312). Russell also 
claimed that he had taken an overnight trip in the Toyota with two male friends on the night 
before the fire, and had not returned until after the fire (R. 398); he falsely claimed that he 
returned the Toyota on the day of the fire, rather than the following day, as reported by its 
owner (R. 399). Later still, Russell changed his alibi story, claiming that he had spent the 
4 
night before the fire with two young women (R. 403, 443-44). The investigator could locate 
nobody to confirm Russell's varying alibi accounts (R. 403-05, 587-89). 
Russell testified in his own defense, giving the self-serving account of his 
activities that he recites in his brief to this Court (R. 487-570; Br. of Appellant at 5-6). He 
gave a garbled account of his inability to identify either of his supposed female alibi 
companions at the time of the Skipper's fire (R. 537-45). The prosecution impeached 
Russell's credibility with his attempted forgery conviction, entered about seven months before 
the fire (R. 527-28). Additionally, Russell admitted that he had lied to the fire investigator 
(and also to an insurance investigator) about his activities at the time of the fire (R. 535, 560). 
The jury found Russell guilty of the Skipper's arson and theft (R. 89-90). 
Jury Selection 
Notwithstanding Russell's claim of unsuccessful record reconstruction efforts, 
the parties, by previously submitted appellate pleadings, have agreed to certain facts regarding 
Russell's jury selection complaint-the sole substantive issue that he pursues on appeal. As 
Russell recites, malfunctioning videotape equipment made it impossible to preserve a verbatim 
transcript of jury selection. Russell's docketing statement, however, lists only one issue 
related to the missing transcript: he challenges the denial of a single for-cause challenge, to 
prospective juror Scott Meredith (Utah Supreme Court Case No. 940563, Docketing Stmt., 
dated 09 December 1994, at 5, copied in appendix II of this brief). That challenge was based 
upon the following account by Russell: "During voir dire, one of the prospective jurors, Scott 
Meredith, told the court that his parents had been the victims of arson. Because of the 
similarity of that situation to the arson charge against Defendant, Defendant moved to dismiss 
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Meredith for cause. That motion was denied* (Docketing Stmt, at 3), On appeal, Russell 
complains of the lack of a jury selection transcript; he also complains of the trial court's 
failure to dismiss prospective juror Meredith for cause.1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although there is no verbatim record of jury selection in this case, the record 
has been sufficiently reconstructed to permit review of the single for-cause juror challenge 
pursued by Russell on appeal. By the parties' agreement, the essential facts pertinent to that 
challenge have been placed before this Court. Even if further facts might be desirable, Russell 
abandoned his effort to place such facts into the record, and cannot now assert the absence of 
such facts to his benefit on appeal. 
On the partially reconstructed record, Russell's for-cause challenge to a single 
prospective juror does not warrant appellate relief. First, Russell's challenge was based upon 
the juror's parents' experience with a crime similar to that charged against Russell. The Utah 
Supreme Court has expressly rejected Russell's premise that juror experience with a similar 
crime, by itself, requires for-cause dismissal. Accordingly, the trial court, which was better 
able than this Court to assess the challenged juror's demeanor and state of mind, did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Russell's for-cause challenge. Even assuming error in the trial 
court's ruling, such error was harmless because Russell removed the challenged juror 
peremptorily, and has not shown that the final, seated jury included any biased jurors. 
Russell's argument that he should not be required to show such prejudice is not properly 
aRussell raised six other assignments of error, unrelated to jury selection, in his docketing 
statement. In his brief to this Court, he pursues none of those claims. 
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before this Court, which is bound by the prejudice requirement announced by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
RUSSELL'S APPEAL CAN BE DECIDED ON ITS MERITS, 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF A VERBATIM 
JURY SELECTION TRANSCRIPT 
Russell first argues that he should be granted a new trial because there is no 
verbatim transcript of jury selection at his trial (Br. of Appellant at 7). In Utah, trial 
transcription errors (or omissions) do not warrant reversal of a criminal verdict unless the 
appellant demonstrates prejudice caused by the errors. State v. Menzies (Menzies /), 845 P.2d 
220, 228 (Utah 1992). Prejudice exists only if the transcription errors harm the appellant's 
"ability to raise or identify appellate issues." Id. at 241. In a non-capital case, transcription 
omissions will be deemed prejudicial only with respect to issues that were preserved by timely 
objection at trial; the possibility of "plain error" during untranscribed trial proceedings does 
not warrant a new trial. Id. at 233 n.47. With this limitation, the answer to the prejudice 
inquiry depends upon the particular circumstances of the case. See id. at 232-33. 
In this case, Russell claims prejudice because of his alleged inability to identify 
jury selection issues on appeal. However, Russell's docketing statement belies his allegation: 
it reflects a single, preserved argument that the trial court should have granted Russell's for-
cause challenge to one prospective juror, Scott Meredith. Besides identifying Meredith by 
name, the docketing statement recites the basis for Russell's challenge, the denial of the 
challenge, and that Russell then removed Meredith with a peremptory strike (Docketing Stmt. 
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at 5). Although these facts are not contained in a transcript, the State has agreed to their 
accuracy (Br. of Appellant at 15-16).2 This agreement effects a partial reconstruction of the 
jury selection record; with respect to Russell's for-cause challenge to prospective juror 
Meredith, the record is amply reconstructed. Cf. Utah R. App. P. 11(f), -(g), -(h) (record 
omissions may be corrected by parties' agreement). Russell has never alleged the existence of 
any other preserved jury selection issues that he might wish to pursue on appeal. 
Therefore, with respect to the single, preserved jury selection issue raised on 
appeal, the parties' agreement about the pertinent underlying facts is functionally equivalent to 
a verbatim transcript. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971); Draper v. 
Washington, 111 U.S. 487, 495-96 (1963) (both stating that a criminal defendant, on appeal, is 
entitled to a trial transcript or its functional equivalent for deciding the issues on appeal). On 
the partially-reconstructed record, Russell's for-cause challenge to prospective juror Meredith 
can be adequately reviewed on appeal. Therefore, the absence of a verbatim jury selection 
transcript does not prejudice Russell in a way that can justify a new trial. 
Nor does State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), relied upon by Russell, 
command a different result. In Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a conviction because 
of numerous transcription gaps covering jury selection in a criminal trial, and because the 
parties had been unable to reconstruct the voir dire responses that were lost in the gaps. 664 
P.2d at 445, 447 n.3. However, as later explained in Menzies /, the result in Taylor was 
2In his brief, Russell adopts the State's recitation that Meredith's parents may have 
been arson victims (Br. of Appellant at 15). Had Russell followed through on his effort to 
more thoroughly reconstruct the record, the State would have proffered, based upon the 
prosecutor's voir dire notes, that the thing burned in that possible arson was a haystack. 
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driven not just by the transcript gaps, but also by the fact that the successfully transcribed 
juror responses suggested juror bias, a claim that by itself "could have resulted in reversal." 
Menzies /, 845 P.2d at 228. In this case, as just explained, the information needed to review 
whether prospective juror Meredith should have been dismissed for cause has been 
reconstructed. Therefore, Taylor does not warrant a new trial in this case. 
Even if more information about prospective juror Meredith might be desired, 
Russell has forfeited his opportunity to produce such information. Rule 11(f), -(g), and -(h), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, explains the procedure for reconstructing the record: the 
parties may reach an agreement about the record's contents, or, if agreement cannot be 
reached, the contested portions of the missing record "shall be submitted to and settled by" the 
trial court. Utah R. App. P. 11(h). In this case, although granted leave to reconstruct the 
record, Russell could not agree with the State about what additional information about panelist 
Meredith (if any) should have been included in the record (No. 950033-CA, Motion to Set 
Briefing Schedule). However, he never proferred any additional information to the trial court 
for settlement-i.e., to resolve his disagreement with the State. Instead, Russell affirmatively 
stated that he was "prepared to present his arguments on appeal" {id.). 
Additionally, Russell makes no claim that the rule 11 procedure for settling the 
record is inadequate. See Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043, 1048-49 (Utah 1985) (appellant 
failed to proffer evidence that could have helped settle the record on appeal). Specifically, he 
does not assert that had he and the prosecutor submitted conflicting accounts of prospective 
juror Meredith's voir dire responses, the trial court would have been unable to resolve the 
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conflict, and thereby more thoroughly reconstruct the record.3 Thus if Meredith's 
untranscribed voir dire contained any additional pertinent information, Russell has abandoned 
his effort to place it into the record on appeal. Under Emig, 703 P.2d at 1049, that 
abandonment works against Russell, not for him. 
In sum, it is certainly unfortunate that a mechanical glitch prevented 
transcription of jury selection at Russell's trial. That misfortune, however, does not require a 
new trial. The record has been sufficiently reconstructed to permit review of the single, for-
cause juror challenge that Russell pursues on appeal. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED RUSSELL'S 
FOR-CAUSE CHALLENGE TO PROSPECTIVE JUROR 
MEREDITH; ALTERNATIVELY, ANY ERROR IN THAT 
RULING WAS HARMLESS. 
There are two alternative bases for affirming Russell's convictions against his 
appellate challenge to prospective juror Meredith. First, this Court can hold that the trial 
court properly denied Russell's for-cause challenge to Meredith. Second, under State v. 
Menzies {Menzies 77), 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 910 
(1995), this Court can hold that any error in denying the for-cause challenge was harmless. 
A. Proper Denial of For-Cause Challenge. 
A trial court's ruling on a for-cause jury challenge is deferentially reviewed on 
appeal, and reversed only for "abuse of discretion" or "clear error." State v. Carter, 888 
3As stated in footnote 2 of this brief, the State would have preferred that the suspected 
Meredith family arson involved a haystack fire. 
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P.2d 629, 649 (Utah), cert, denied, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 163 (1995); State v. Young, 853 
P.2d 327, 395 (Utah 1993). Such deference is appropriate given the trial court's advantaged 
position to assess the prospective juror's demeanor, and hence, credibility and state of mind. 
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Further, trial courts are instructed to 
dismiss a prospective juror for cause only if he or she harbors "strong and deep impressions" 
about the case at bar. State v. Julian, 111 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Utah 1989) (quoting Reynolds 
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878)).4 Accord Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(13) (for-cause 
dismissal appropriate when juror has "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as 
to whether the defendant is guilty . . . " ) ; Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14) (for-cause dismissal 
appropriate when "a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with respect to the cause, or 
to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially . . . " ) . 
Based upon the foregoing standards and upon controlling case law, this Court 
should affirm the denial of Russell's for-cause challenge to prospective juror Meredith. 
Russell challenged Meredith because Meredith's parents had evidently been arson victims. 
The trial court, having observed Meredith during voir dire, credited him with the mature 
ability to set aside his parents' experience in trying this case. Absent any clear statement by 
Meredith to the contrary (again, Russell proffers no such statements), that trial court 
assessment cannot be deemed clearly erroneous. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935 (rulings on state 
of mind are reviewed for "clear error"). 
4In Carter, 888 P.2d at 650 & n.32, the Utah Supreme Court, exercising its 
"supervisory authority," directed trial courts to dismiss for cause any prospective jurors whose 
impartiality might be suspect, but specifically limited that rule to capital cases. 
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Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly rejected the notion that a 
prospective juror's experience with a similar crime forms ground to dismiss the juror for 
cause: "The mere fact that a juror has had some family connection to a criminal act would not 
justify a challenge for cause." State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1992) (lead opinion 
of Durham, J.); id. at 249 (Stewart, J., concurring in result); id. at 251 (Howe, J., 
dissenting).5 Furthermore, the supreme court's ruling in Thomas was made in the context of 
facts far more suggestive of bias than the facts in this case: Thomas was a rape prosecution, 
and the female juror in question had once been assaulted by a man who had hidden in her 
automobile. 830 P.2d at 244. In this case, prospective juror Meredith had not himself been 
an arson victim; only his parents had that experience. Therefore, in light of Thomas, and 
given the advantage of first-hand observation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying Russell's for-cause challenge to Meredith. 
B. Harmless Error. 
Even if the trial court should have dismissed Meredith for cause, its failure to 
do so was harmless error under Menzies II, because Russell peremptorily removed Meredith. 
In Menzies II, the Utah Supreme Court overruled a line of Utah authority which had held it 
prejudicial, and reversible error per se, when a party uses a peremptory challenge to remove a 
juror who should have been excused for cause. Menzies II, 889 P.2d at 397-400. The rule 
5A prospective juror's experience with a similar crime justifies a for-cause challenge 
when the juror admits strong feelings engendered by that experience. See, e.g., State v. 
Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 882 (Utah 1981) (two jurors who expressed "bitterness" and a "strong 
emotional link" as victims of similar crimes should have been dismissed for cause). No such 
admission is alleged in this case. 
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now is that once a biased juror has been peremptorily removed, the trial court's failure to 
dismiss the juror for cause will only warrant appellate reversal if the appellant proves "that he 
faced a partial or biased jury" as a result. Id. at 400. Such reversal-justifying prejudice exists 
when "a member of the [seated] jury was partial or incompetent." Id. at 398.6 
Russell does not attempt to prove prejudice under Menzies II. Under settled law 
of appellate procedure, the failure to make arguments necessary to obtain appellate relief is 
fatal to an appeal. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (appellate court 
is not a "dumping ground" for undeveloped contentions); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) ("This court has 
routinely declined to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal"). This 
settled principle, by itself, defeats Russell's appellate challenge to prospective juror Meredith. 
Nor does it appear that Russell could prove the necessary prejudice. Again, to 
prove prejudice caused by an erroneous refusal to excuse Meredith for cause, Russell would 
have to show that once his four peremptory challenges were exhausted on Meredith and three 
other prospective jurors, a biased or incompetent juror sat on the jury that decided his guilt. 
Menzies II, 889 P.2d at 398. Such proof would be difficult to make even upon a full, verbatim 
record. In this case, no verbatim record exists. However, as explained in Point One of this 
brief, Russell had the opportunity to reconstruct the record as he saw fit to support his 
contentions on appeal. He abandoned his record reconstruction effort. Accordingly, this 
6But see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233-34 (1978) (jury deliberations are a 
group process in which individual juror biases are counterbalanced). Ballew suggests that 
even a jury with one or more biased jurors can be impartial when viewed collectively. 
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Court-again, in accord with settled practice-should presume the regularity of the trial court's 
jury selection decisions. State v. Rowlings, 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah App. 1992) (citing 
State v. Cash, 727 P.2d 218 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)). Utilizing that presumption, this Court 
should hold that no biased juror sat on Russell's trial jury. 
Rather than attempting to prove prejudice under Menzies II, Russell argues that 
Menzies II was wrongly decided by the Utah Supreme Court (Br. of Appellant at 18-28). He 
appropriately concedes, however, that this Court is not at liberty to reverse decisions of its 
higher appellate court. Sentry Investigations, Inc. v. Davis, 841 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah App. 
1992) (cited in Br. of Appellant at 19); accord Menzies II, 889 P.2d at 399 n.3 ("Vertical stare 
decisis . . . compels a court to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court"). That 
is all that this Court need know: even assuming that prospective juror Meredith should have 
been dismissed for cause, the Menzies II prejudice requirement controls this case.7 
7Russell's elaborate argument to overrule Menzies II is presently before the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Arguelles, No. 930036. As fully developed in the State's brief in 
that case, Russell's argument, like that of appellant Arguelles, is frivolous. In summary, 
Russell and Arguelles fail to acknowledge that Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), upon 
which the Utah Supreme Court relied in Menzies II, continues to be favorably cited by the 
United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1992); 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991); Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 
U.S. 415, 424-25 (1991). Further, in arguing, contrary to Ross, that harmless error analysis 
cannot apply to jury selection errors of the type alleged in this case, Russell and Arguelles 
misrely upon the case line of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), prohibiting improper 
racial or gender bias in the exercise of peremptory challenges. In such cases, harmless error 
analysis does not apply because the harm in question is to the wrongfully excluded jurors-not 
to either party. See, e.g.,J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1419, 
1427 (1994). State's Brief of Appellee, State v. Arguelles, Utah Supreme Court No. 930036 
(filed 02 November 1995), at 23-26. 
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Russell has not proven clear error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's 
denial of his for-cause challenge to prospective juror Meredith. Additionally, Russell has not 
proven prejudice caused by the denial of his for-cause challenge under Menzies //, given that 
he peremptorily struck Meredith. Therefore, this Court must reject Russell's appellate 
challenge to prospective juror Meredith. 
CONCLUSION 
The partially-reconstructed record permits appellate review of Russell's jury 
selection argument in this case. That argument fails because there was no error, nor reversal-
justifying prejudice if there were error, in the trial court's resolution of the for-cause juror 
challenge pursued by Russell on appeal. For these reasons, Russell's convictions should be 
AFFIRMED. Oral argument on this fact-specific case appears advisable. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 ^ day of December, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing brief of appellee 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to RONALD S. FUJINO of SALT LAKE LEGAL 
DEFENDER ASSOC., attorneys for defendant-appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this "Z4> day of December, 1995. 
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APPENDIX I 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
417 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 11 
Rule 11. The record on appeal. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal The original papers and ex-
hibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index 
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute 
the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of 
the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as 
the record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this 
rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial 
court shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with colla-
tion in the following order: 
(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(B) the docket sheet; 
(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(D) all published depositions in chronological order; and 
(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order. 
(2) (A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of 
the collated record with a sequential number using one series of 
numerals for the entire record. 
(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, 
the clerk shall collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the 
supplemental record in the same order as the original record and 
mark the bottom right corner of each page of the collated supplemen-
tal record with a'sequential number beginning with the number next 
following the number of the last page of the original record. 
(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The 
index shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper was filed in 
the trial court and the starting page of the record on which the paper will 
be found. 
(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and 
procedures for checking out the record after pagination for use by the 
parties in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a 
petition for writ of certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in 
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply 
with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any 
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and 
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be in-
cluded by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal. 
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the papers to be transmitted shall 
consist of the following. 
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the 
papers, excluding any transcripts, total fewer than 300 pages, all of 
the papers will be transmitted to the appellate court upon completion 
of the filing of briefs. In such cases, the appellant shall serve upon the 
clerk of the trial court, simultaneously with the filing of appellant's 
reply brief, notice of the date on which appellant's reply brief was 
filed. If appellant does not intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall 
notify the clerk of the trial court of that fact within 30 days of the 
filing of appellee's brief. 
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the papers, 
excluding any transcripts, are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall 
file with the clerk of the trial court, within 10 days after briefing is 
completed, a joint or separate designation of those papers referred to 
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in their respective briefe. Only those designated papers and the fol-
lowing, to the extent applicable, shall be transmitted to the clerk of 
the appellate court by the clerk of the trial court: 
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(ii) the pretrial order, if any; 
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from 
which the appeal is taken; 
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any; 
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of 
law filed or delivered by the trial court; 
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon 
which the court rendered judgment, if any; 
(vii) jury instructions given, if any; 
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any; 
(ix) the notice of appeal. 
(3) Agency cases. Where all papers in the agency record total fewer 
than 300 pages, the agency shall transmit all papers to the appellate 
court. Where all papers in the agency record total 300 or more pages, the 
parties shall, within 10 days after briefing is completed, file with the 
agency a joint or separate designation of those papers necessary to the 
appeal. The agency shall transmit those designated papers to the appel-
late court. Instead of filing all papers or designated papers, the agency 
may, with the approval of the court, file only the chronological index of 
the record or of such parts of the record as the parties may designate. All 
parts of the record retained by the agency shall be considered part of the 
record on review for all purposes, 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice 
to appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 dayB after fil-
ing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a 
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the 
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within 
the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and 
the clerk of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a 
compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed 
format within the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceed-
ings are to be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a 
certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with 
the clerk of the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the proceed-
ings were otherwise recorded, the appellant shall request from a court 
transcriber certified in accordance with the rules and procedures of the 
Judicial Council a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already 
on file as the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties 
approved by the appellate court, a person other than a certified court 
transcriber may transcribe a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate 
court shall, upon request, provide a list of all certified court transcribers. 
The transcriber is subject to all of the obligations imposed on reporters by 
these rules. 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged 
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant 
to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obli-
gated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions 
of the transcript. 
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the 
entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days 
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after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be 
presented on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request 
or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a tran-
script of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, 
within 10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the 
statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation 
of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of 
such designation the appellant has requested such parts and has so noti-
fied the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either 
request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the 
appellant to do so. 
(4) Payment of reporter. At the time of the request, a party shall 
make satisfactory arrangements with the reporter or transcriber for pay-
ment of the cost of the transcript. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on 
appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and 
sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal 
arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the 
facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision 
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together 
with such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present 
the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk 
of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate 
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court 
shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon 
approval of the statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made 
or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceed-
ings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the 
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the 
best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on 
the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days 
after service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall 
be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and 
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as 
to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the 
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made 
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from 
the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the 
trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmit-
ted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if neces-
sary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving 
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties 
a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party 
may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the 
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The nils if 
amended to make applicable in the Supreme 
Court a procedure of the Court of Appeals for 
preparing a transcript where the record is 
maintained by an electronic recording device. 
The rule if modified slightly from the former 
Court of Appeals rule to make it the appel-
lants responsibility, not the clerk's responsi-
bility to arrange for the preparation of the 
transcript 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1,1992, added the sec-
ond sentence in Subdivision (a) and made sty-
listic changes in the third sentence; in Subdivi-
sion (b) inserted "and any transcript" and sub-
stituted "a chronological index" for "an alpha-
betical index* in the first sentence and added 
the third sentence; and in Subdivision (d) de-
leted "and Exhibits" from the heading, deleted 
"original" before "papers* in four places, re-
Rule 18 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 356 
knowledge as to guilt of accused — modern 
state cases, 88 AJLR.3d 449. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecu-
tor's argument giving jury impression that de-
fense counsel believes accused guilty, 89 
A.LJL3d 263. 
Disruptive conduct of accused in presence of 
jury as ground for mistrial or discharge of jury, 
89 A.LRSd 960. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of gagging, 
shackling, or otherwise physically restraining 
accused during course of state criminal trial, 
90 A.L.R.3d 17. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecu-
tor's argument to jury indicating that he has 
additional evidence of defendant's guilt which 
he did not deem necessary to present, 90 
A.L.R.3d 646. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecu-
tor's argument giving jury impression that 
judge believes defendant guilty, 90 AJLR3d 
822. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of sending 
written instructions with retiring jury in crim-
inal case, 91 A.L.R.3d 382. 
Propriety of requiring criminal defendant to 
exhibit self, or perform physical act, or partici-
pate in demonstration, during trial and in 
presence of jury, 3 A.L.R4th 374. 
Incompetency of counsel: adequacy of de-
fense counsel's representation of criminal cli-
ent regarding right to and incidents of jury 
trial, 3 A.L.R.4th 601. 
Propriety of court's dismissing indictment or 
prosecution because of failure of jury to agree 
after successive trials, 4 A.L.R.4th 1274. 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding argument, 6 
A.L.R.4th 16. 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding entrapment de-
fense, 8 A.L.R.4th 1160. 
Waiver, after not guilty plea, of jury trial in 
felony case, 9 A.L.R.4th 695. 
Modern status of law regarding cure of error, 
in instruction as to one offense, by conviction of 
higher or lesser offense, 15 A.L.R4th 118. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of informing 
jury that witness in criminal prosecution has 
taken polygraph test, 15 A.L.R.4th 824. 
Presence of alternate juror in juxy room as 
ground for reversal of stats criminal con vie-
tion, 15 A.L.R.4th 1127. 
Juror's reading of newspaper account of trial 
in state criminal case during its progress as 
ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 46 
AJLR4th 11. 
Unauthorized view of premises by juror or 
jury in criminal case as ground for reversal, 
new trial, or mistrial, 50 ALJL4th 995. 
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 
A.L.R4th 565. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to preserve confidentiality of under-
cover witness, 54 AXJUth 1156. 
Prosecutor's appeal in criminal case to self-
interest or prejudice of jurors as taxpayers as 
ground for reversal, new trial, or mistrial, 60 
AXJUth 1063. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
by conducting trial or part thereof at other 
than regular place or time, 70 AX.R.4th 632. 
Prosecutor's appeal in criminal case to ra-
cial, national, or religious prejudice as ground 
for mistrial, new trial, reversal, or vacation of 
sentence — modern cases, 70 A.L.R.4th 664. 
Propriety of trial court order limiting time 
for opening or closing argument in criminal 
case — state cases, 71 A.LR.4th 200. 
Negative characterization or description of 
defendant, by prosecutor during summation of 
criminal trial, as ground for reversal, new 
trial, or mistrial — modern cases, 88 A.L.R4th 
8. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's 
negative characterization or description of wit-
ness during summation of criminal trial — 
modern cases, 88 A.L.R.4th 209. 
Juror's reading of newspaper account of trial 
in federal criminal case during its progress as 
ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 85 
A.L.R. Fed. 13. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 618 et 
seq.; Jury *» 12(3), 20 to 25, 29. 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors that are to 
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all peremptory 
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another iuror 
shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, ana any 
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause 
are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory 
challenge to one iuror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until 
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call 
the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute 
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose 
names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examina-
tion of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit 
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant. 
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(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or 
for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection 
made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material 
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, 
drawing, summoning and return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is 
•worn and shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall 
specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the chal-
lenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a 
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the chal-
lenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be 
called as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the 
panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial 
in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall 
direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the 
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evi-
dence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges 
to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall 
be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
leed be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory chal-
lenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory chal-
lenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory chal-
lenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defen-
iants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised sepa-
rately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be 
aken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person 
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other rela-
tionship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which rela-
tionship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be dis-
qualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a 
criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, 
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a ver-
dict after the case was submitted to it; 
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(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defen-
dant for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude 
the juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction 
regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carry-
ing on of which is a violation of Law, where defendant is charged with a 
like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant 
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate 
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or 
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution and 
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alter-
nate juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath and 
enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the person 
exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in 
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence 
and the instructions of the court. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Croft-References. — Number of jurors, 
Utah Const., Art I, Sec. 10; I 7S-46-5. 
Selection of jury, I 78-46-1 et eeq. 
ANALYSIS 
Attenuation of bias. 
Challenge! for cause. 
—Actual bias. 
Opinion bated on rumor, journal, etc. 
—Capital cates. 
—Consanguinity or affinity* 
—Grand jury member. 
—Improper denial. 
—Juror on previous trial of offense. 
Different defendant. 
—-Relationship with attorney. 
—Relationship with party, witness, or victim. 
—Specificity. 
—State employees. 
—Unmerited. 
Competency. 
Death aualified jury. 
Duty or trial court 
Homicide cates. 
Juror excused on court's motion. 
Peremptory challenges. 
—Capital cates. 
—Multiple defendants. 
Refusal to question jury panel. 
Time for challenging. 
Trial before unlawful jury. 
Voir dire. 
—Death penalty views, 
—Discretion of court 
—Religious beliefs. 
Cited. 
Attenuation of bias. 
When a prospective juror expresses an atti-
APPENDIX II 
Appellate Pleadings re: Record Reconstruction 
Appellate Docketing Statement 
RONALD S. FUJINO (USB #5387) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ALLEN CARL RUSSELL, 
Defendant/Appellant 
MOTION, STIPULATION, AND ORDER 
TO STAY BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
PENDING RECONSTRUCTION AND 
SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE RECORD 
Case No. 950033 
Trial No. 941901057 
Priority No. 2 
COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant, Allen Carl Russell, by 
and through counsel, Ron S. Fujino and Lisa J. Remal, and hereby 
moves this Court to stay the briefing schedule pending 
reconstruction and supplementation of the record. Following the 
lower court proceedings which were recorded by videotape, the 
court reporter determined that there was 1 hour and 45 minutes of 
blank tape. See Addendum A. Rule 11(g) provides: 
If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a 
hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is 
unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement 
of the evidence or proceedings from the best 
available means, including recollection. The 
statement shall be served on the appellee, who may 
serve objections or propose amendments within 10 
days after service. The statement and any 
objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted 
to the trial court for settlement and approval and, 
as settled, and approved, shall be included by the 
clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
Utah R. App. P. 11(g) 
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The parties will attempt to prepare a statement of the 
omitted proceedings for inclusion into the record on appeal. 
Pending such reconstruction and supplementation into the record, 
Appellant requests a staying of the briefing due date (presently 
scheduled for August 7, 1995) . 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this <?£# day of July, 1995. 
ROI^LD S. YUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
STIPULATION 
I, J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, have 
read the foregoing motion and hereby stipulate to staying the 
briefing schedule pending reconstruction and supplementation of 
the record. 
DATED this / ^ day of July, 1995. 
)ERICV( J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
i * n*x" 
FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF A P P E A L S * " ^ ^ ^ ^ W ^ 
ooooo ' COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Allen Carl Russell, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 950033-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion to 
stay briefing schedule pending reconstruction and supplementation 
of the record. Appellee stipulated to thei motion. 
Appellant seeks to stay the due date for appellant's brief 
pending the preparation and approval of a statement of the 
evidence or proceedings under Rule 11(g), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is stayed for a period 
of forty five (45) days from the date hereof, by which date 
appellate shall, depending upon the circumstances, file either 
(1) a motion to continue the stay, or (2) appellant's brief. 
Dated this [0 day of August, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judirn M. Billings, 
m 1 4 
RONALD S. FUJINO (USB #5387) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ALLEN CARL RUSSELL, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
MOTION TO SET 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
Case No. 950033 
Trial No. 941901057 
Priority No. 2 
Pursuant to this Court's Order, dated August 10, 1995, the 
State and Mr. Russell have attempted to reconstruct the record of 
the proceedings below (i.e. the court reporter determined that 
there was 1 hour and 45 minutes of blank tape). Neither party 
was able to do so. 
With or without the attempted reconstruction, Mr. Russell is 
prepared to present his arguments on appeal. He respectfully 
requests this Court to now set the briefing schedule. Due to the 
length of time required to attempt completion of the record, the 
brief could not have been otherwise prepared in the time allotted 
for reconstruction. 
^ RESPECTFULLY submitted this Z> day of September, 1995. 
RONALD S. ^ FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Ron S. Fujino, hereby certify that I have caused an 
original and four copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102; a copy to the Attorney General's Office, 23 6 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and a copy to the 
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this 0^ day of September, 1995. 
3^ €• 
RONALD S, 
DELIVERED by this day of 
September, 1995. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Allen Carl Russell, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FiLED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 0 6 1995 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 950033-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion to 
set briefing schedule, filed September 25, 1995. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted. 
Appellant's brief shall be filed within thirty (30) days from the 
date of this order. 
Dated this 
BY THE COURT: 
^ day of October, 1995. 
Michael s, Judge 
\ <w 
LISA J. REMAL, #2722 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
DEC 0 9 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ALLEN CARL RUSSELL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Subject to Assignment to the 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 940563 
Priority No. 2 
1. DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND CONVICTION FOR 
AGGRAVATED ARSON, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-6-103 (1953 AS AMENDED), AND THEFT, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (1953 AS AMENDED): 
November 4, 1994. 
2. NATURE OF POSTJUDGMENT MOTION(S) AND DATE(S) FILED: 
None. 
3. DATE AND EFFECT OF ORDER(S) DISPOSING OF POSTJUDGMENT 
MOTION(S) AND ORDER OF DETERMINATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 54(b): Not applicable. 
4. DATE OF FILING NOTICE OF APPEAL: November 18, 1994. 
5. JURISDICTION: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2-(3)(i) (1953 as 
amended), whereby the defendant in a criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment and conviction for 
a first degree felony. 
6. NAME OF TRIAL COURT OR AGENCY: The Honorable Robert L. 
Newey for the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
7. STATEMENT OF FACTS: On June 17, 1994, there was a fire 
at Skipper's Restaurant, 5575 S. Redwood Rd., Taylorsville, Utah. 
Police and fire investigators determined that the fire was 
intentionally set, and that the business' safe had been opened and 
approximately $900.00 had been taken. After an investigation, law 
enforcement concluded that the fire was set by a current or former 
employee who had a key to the business' front door, knew the safe 
combination, and also knew the alarm code. Various employees were 
interviewed, including Defendant. He told investigators that, at 
the time of the fire, he was in Butterfield Canyon with his friend, 
Roger Nelson; when the investigators contacted Nelson, he denied 
being with Defendant then. Defendant was charged with Aggravated 
Arson and Theft. 
Prior to the beginning of the trial, Defendant moved in 
limine to suppress statements he made to investigators in which he 
said he had been with Roger Nelson on the morning of the fire; the 
grounds for his motion were that the statements were hearsay because 
they did not qualify as non-hearsay under Utah Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2) as they were not admissions of wrong-doing. That motion 
was denied. 
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During voir dire, one of the prospective jurors, Scott 
Meredith, told the court that his parents had been the victims of 
arson. Because of the similarity of that situation to the arson 
charge against Defendant, Defendant moved to dismiss Meredith for 
cause. That motion was denied. 
Defendant invoked the exclusionary rule pursuant to 
Rule 615, Utah Rules of Evidence, which the court granted for all 
witnesses except fire investigator Gary Mudrock. Defendant argued 
that Mudrock did not fit within the exception in Rule 615(b) because 
he is employed by Salt Lake County and Plaintiff was the State of 
Utah; thus, he is not an employee of the party (the State) as he is 
an employee of another entity (the County). Defendant also argued 
that Rule 615(c) did not apply as the State made no showing that 
Mudrock's presence was "essential." The court allowed Mudrock to be 
present during the entire trial. 
At the close of the State's case, Defendant moved the court 
to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. That motion was denied. 
Also at that time, Defendant moved the court to reduce the charge 
from Aggravated Arson, a first degree felony, to Arson, a second 
degree felony, pursuant to State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (1966), on 
the grounds that both statutes proscribe the conduct Defendant was 
alleged to have committed and, therefore, he should be charged with 
the offense carrying the less serious penalty. That motion was 
denied. 
During the trial, State's witness Darren Nielsen testified 
that Defendant was doing his "community service" at some point 
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during the relevant events. Defendant moved for a mistrial on the 
grounds that such testimony made it clear to the jury that Defendant 
had been on probation for a prior conviction. That motion was 
denied. 
During the prosecutor's closing argument, he told jurors 
that Defendant didn't correct his previous lie to investigator 
Mudrock in which he falsely said he was with Roger Nelson at the 
time the fire started. Defendant objected on the grounds that such 
a comment improperly commented on Defendant's United States and Utah 
constitutional right to remain silent. The court overruled that 
objection. 
The trial took place in Judge Richard Moffat's courtroom in 
the Third Judicial District Court; that courtroom is equipped with 
videocameras instead of a court reporter. Defendant filed the 
Designation of Record which asked for a transcript to be prepared of 
the voir dire, among other things. On December 5, 1994, the 
assigned court reporter filed his Reporter's Transcript 
Acknowledgement which states that "the requested jury voir dire has 
been found to be an hour and 45 minutes of blank tape." 
8. ISSUE (S) FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD (S) OF APPELLATE REVIEW: 
A. Did the trial court err in denying 
Defendant's motion in limine to preclude the 
State from presenting in its case-in-chief 
Defendant's statement to investigator Mudrock on 
the grounds it did not qualify as non-hearsay 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)? 
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Standard of Review; The trial judge's 
conclusion is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994). Any 
underlying factual determinations are viewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. 
B. Did the trial court err in denying 
Defendant's challenge for cause to prospective 
juror Scott Meredith? 
Standard of Review: The trial judge's 
decision on a challenge for cause is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Gotschall, 782 
P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989). The exercise of 
discretion is viewed, however, "in light of the 
fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any 
problem of bias simply by excusing the 
prospective juror and selecting another." 
Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 
1981). Erroneous denial of a challenge for cause 
requires reversal where the error is not 
harmless. State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 
23, 26 (Utah 1994). 
C. Did the trial court err in refusing to 
require the exclusion of investigator Mudrock 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 615? 
Standard of Review; The trial judge's 
conclusion is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994). Any 
underlying factual determinations are viewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. 
D. Did the trial court err in denying 
Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency 
of evidence at the close of the State's case? 
Standard of Review: A jury verdict is 
reviewed viewing "the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the verdict." State v. Seale, 853 
P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1993), cert, denied, 62 USLW 
3249; accord State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233 
(Utah 1992)• A jury verdict is reversed only if 
"'the evidence . . . is [so] sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted.' ft State v. 
Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
See also State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1993) . 
E. Did the trial court err in denying 
Defendant's motion to reduce the charge from 
Aggravated Arson, a first degree felony, to 
Arson, a second degree felony, pursuant to 
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (1966)? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a 
question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1994) . 
F. Did the trial court err in denying 
Defendant's motion for mistrial after a State's 
witness testified that Defendant was doing 
"community service," thus making it clear he was 
on probation for a prior conviction? 
Standard of Review: This issue is 
reviewed for correctness. Any underlying factual 
determinations are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. Pena, 869 P.2d at 937. 
G. Did the trial court err in overruling 
Defendant's objection to the prosecutor's 
comment, during closing argument, that Defendant 
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didn't correct his previous lie to investigator 
Mudrock when arrested, on the grounds that said 
comment violated Defendant's constitutional right 
to remain silent? 
Standard of Review; This issue is 
reviewed for correctness. Id. 
9. DETERMINATION OF CASE BY SUPREME COURT: This Court 
should determine this case because Defendant was convicted of and 
sentenced on a first degree felony, over which the Utah Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction. 
10. DETERMINATIVE LAW: 
A. Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). 
B. State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 
1991, cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
C. Utah Rule of Evidence 615. 
D. State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
E. State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (1966). 
F. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985). 
G. United States Constitution, Amendment V. 
H. Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12, 7. 
11. RELATED APPEALS: There are no related appeals. 
12. ATTACHMENTS: Judgment, Sentence (Commitment); Notice 
of Appeal; Affidavit of Impecuniosity; Designation of Record; 
Certificate; Request for Transcript. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _J day of December, 1994 
/DCHO. &**! 
LISA J J REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LISA J. REMAL, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this I day of 
December, 1994. 
LISA J. ftEMAL 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of December, 1994 
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